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Abstract
Based on a few research analyses, M1/M15 concession motorway project has been analysed, which
was the first tolled and shared financed project in the CEE region with more or less success. The
objectives of this analysis were to find answers to institutional questions about how to involve private
capital into road infrastructure development in politically acceptable way, using a psycho-economic
model. This paper starts with introduction and overview of the Hungarian concession motorway
project’s history. After the short description of the applied model, key actors are identified and
described, as the politicians/regulators, transport providers and their interest groups, the public with
interest groups and the media. This is followed by findings of in-depth analysis of the motivations
and decisions, to be able to set up the stakeholders’ characteristics and a way of decisions. This
systematic description and the positive analysis of the different key actors lead to explanations of
the situation and the causalities in occurrence of the Hungarian concession motorway project. The
analysis criteria are problem perception, goals, information provision, effectiveness, equity/fairness
issues, social environment, implementation process and finally the political and institutional setting.
The conclusion attempts to give lessons to be learned, answers to institutional and regulatory questions
and policy recommendations for decision-makers.
Keywords: psycho-economic model, motorway concession, transport institutions, political accept-
ability, Hungary.
1. Introduction
The turn of the century sets to the European Union several big challenges. The
new European Common Transport Policy and the accession of new member coun-
tries assign new tasks to the Commission. Its efforts were consistently devoted to
developing the basic philosophy of the Common Transport Policy in the last two
decades. However, it has entered into a new era, the interest now has turned to is-
sues of implementation. Responsible authorities in various member countries and
on the European level follow the right strategies in implementation process. The
aim of the authorities must be to guarantee that transport markets function properly.
Where due to inherent problems of market failure this is not possible, they must
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find a feasible and politically acceptable way to correct the market failure. This
objective faces major political conflicts of interests several times. Furthermore, the
institutional framework in certain countries may impose tight boundaries on what
is feasible. Failures in attempts of liberalization are usually followed by a return to
state intervention. Hungary also faces up to the consequences of transition period,
from planned economy to the market one. This paper aims to emphasize barriers
of political acceptability in the Hungarian context. We applied an integrated po-
litical model of acceptability called ‘psycho-economic’ approach [2] (combination
of different theories of regulation and psychology) to analyse the implementation
process of privatization and the failure to operate a private tolled motorway in Hun-
gary (M1/M15). Defining key actors and their objectives, and examining them by
using an analysis matrix of different relevant criteria lead to general findings and
policy recommendations, with respect to successful policy implementation.
2. History of Concession Motorways M1/M15
In the 1990sHungary performed an experimentwith privatelyfinanced and operated
motorways. This experiment pertained to two short stretches on the M1/M15 and
on the M5. The M1/M15 motorways are parts of the TEN Helsinki Corridor IV
and therefore parts of the connection between Budapest, Vienna and Bratislava. On
the M1/M15 the amount of kilometres covered by the experiment was less than 60
(M1: 43 km, M15: 14km).
This project was the first privately financed and tolled infrastructure project
in Hungary. The concession to build and operate the motorway was given to a
private company ELMKARt., the financing was arranged by a consortium of inter-
national banks under the leadership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development in London; the credits were granted in USD and DEM. The role of
the Hungarian state was limited to providing the necessary land, to build new feeder
roads and to adopt measures for traffic calming on the secondary parallel roads; this
meant a marginal share in total project budget.
It was planned that interest, amortization and operating cost of the project
were to be totally financed out of user charges which were collected in HUF. Tolls
were to be regulated according to a price-capping scheme, where tolls could be
adjusted according to the increase in the consumer price index and exchange rate
changes (USD/HUF, DEM/HUF), without prior permission of the authorities.
The first tolled sections on the M1 motorway were opened in 1996. Toll
rate was 0.15 ¤/km for passenger cars. For vans, buses and HGV’s this rate was
multiplied according to their weights. The agreed toll rate from 1993 to opening
date became insupportably high due to devaluation of the national currency and
drop in real incomes.
However, it turned out that there were mainly Western foreign cars travelling
long-distances, which used the tolled section. Most traffic, especially goods traffic,
switched to secondary roads. Given the short distances mentioned before and
POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY 159
minimal time savings this is, perhaps, no surprise. The main differences in norm of
foreign and domestic userswere the frequency of travelling (frequent; non-frequent)
and their purchasing power (strong; weak). Therefore, shortly after the M1 was
opened for the public, on the part of domestic users several legal cases were brought
forward against ELMKA. The first one was a municipal procedure, the second one
a civil suit started by the lawyer of the Hungarian Automobile Club.
In the first case ELMKA was charged before the Hungarian Competition
Council (HCC)with the accusation that it was exploiting a dominantmarket position
and that its toll rates were too high. However, the HCC ruled that according to the
Hungarian Competition Law the concession company was not guilty of abusing
economic power, because their maximum levels were still lower than the ones fixed
in the concession contract. This decision, however, went into appeal before the
court of first instance. The court came to the conclusion that according to the Civil
Code the toll rates were extremely high compared to other public services (the
decision was based on the parallel, civil procedure at the civil court, see below).
Another appeal before the court of second instance followed. This time the court
ruled that the case had to be judged after the Capital Market Act (according to which
the calculation method of toll rates was acceptable), not the Civil Code. Therefore
the concession company was acquitted.
In the second case at the civil court it was ruled that according to the Civil
Code the toll rates were unfair and extremely high, and that therefore the concession
company had to pay back the excessive part of the toll paid exclusively by the lawyer
of the Hungarian Automobile Club. The ruling has been interpreted by the media
as a general obligation, it frightened lenders who suspended disbursement of the
loans for financing subsequent section (M15), until additional sovereign guarantee
was provided.
These legal proceedings (among other reasons) resulted in a substantial rev-
enue shortfall for the operating company., In 1999 ELMKA finally went bankrupt
and the government took over the responsibilities and liabilities, reduced toll rates
immediately by 50% and rescheduled the debts. In 2000 the government replaced
the toll system by a vignette system for the whole state-owned motorway network.
The failure of this project led temporarily to political resistance to further privately
financed infrastructure projects in Hungary; but these experiences improved the
viability of the other concession motorway company, and politicians decided to call
for concessions again.
The following factors determined the failure of the policy in case of M1/M15:
• The economic foundations were based on far too optimistic traffic forecasts;
this was the reason of substantial traffic and revenue shortfall. (This empha-
sises the role of information provision in the implementation process.)
• The public felt unfairly treated because of the high toll rates, which led to
two court cases against the operating company.
• The institutional framework in Hungary was very susceptible to what eco-
nomists call ‘regulatory risk’. Regulatory risk refers to a situation where
the private investor has already made his investments (in the form of ‘sunk
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costs’) and where accordingly he becomes exploitable by the government
or the regulatory authorities. Infrastructure by its very nature is used by a
large part of the (voting) population. As a consequence, politicians have
an incentive to exploit the investor’s weak bargaining situation by lowering
user charges. But they can do this only in an environment without strong
institutional safeguards against such an opportunistic behaviour (e.g. a strong
tradition of protecting property rights, or strong and independent courts, etc.).
Apparently Hungary’s institutions at present do not offer enough safeguard
against such a behaviour.
3. Scope and Objectives of the Analysis Matrix
The integrated model of political acceptability is not a formal mathematical model
but rather a set of criteria and hypotheses that seem to be essential for analysing
the institutions and the political processes involved in European transport policy-
making. The partial approaches are frequently used in the non-economic social
sciences and psychology. The developed ‘psycho-economic’ model is a synthesis
of common ideas of the two input models. The first one [5] represents theoretical
and empirical work concerning the acceptability of pricing measures in transport
policy, they look at the problem from a psychological point of view, with several
central variables in a heuristic model of acceptability of transport policies. The
second one [6] is an attempt to combine the media system and cognitive aspects
of media production and of transport policy-making into the positive theory of
economic regulation. The model is based on the identification of key actors and
interest groups in the policy process and relevant analysis criteria (the choice of
criteria was led by empirical and theoretical work of the authors) [2].
The main goals of the model were to analyse the relations between the key
actors and their impact on the implementation of a policy measure (see Fig.1).
The key dimensions of the model are reflected in matrix structure, where each
column corresponds to a particular actor of transport policy (x.1 – x.4) and each
row contains a criterion (1.y – 8.y) (see Table 1).
At the last criterion (8.y) a decision tree scheme [1] was applied in the frame-
work of the model of political acceptability, analysing the influence on implemen-
tation of transport policy. This scheme is based on the transaction cost theory and
has already been proven very successful in analysing telecommunication policy,
to contend the supposed factors which could be responsible for success or failure
of a transport policy measure. The decision tree (Fig.2) applied in the Hungarian
context see below.
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Voting Population
Politician/Legislator/
Regulator
Transport Sector
(Markets, Companies)
Principal-Agent-
Relationship 1
Principal-Agent-
Relationship 2
Media
Fig. 1. Framework of political acceptability (key actors and relations) [ 2]
Table 1. Analysis matrix with key actors and criteria [2]
Key actors Transport Politicians/ Public,
providers, Regulators interest groups Media
Criteria interest groups
Problem perception 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Goals 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Information provision 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Effectiveness 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Equity/Fairness 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
Social Environment 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
Implementation process 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
Political & institutional
setting
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4
4. Findings
The analysis [3] investigated the main coherences of events and actions of different
key actors according to the analysis criteria.
In private investors’ point of view profit maximization, on the part of lenders
interests/debt service are standing in the centre of the problem perception. The con-
cession company’s main interest was revenue maximization, to cope with its debt
service obligations [4]. If the assessed risks could be in any way decreased, because
of any state contribution, private capital would be fighting for opportunities. There-
fore, it means that public participation in such projects is more desirable towards
reducing costs and increasing benefits of private investors. Politicians/regulators
need to ‘act’ to create opportunities for private capital in financing transport in-
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frastructure. Therefore, it can substitute stage budget resources and can improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure operation. Due to implementing
private financing in transport infrastructure development, there were welfare losses
regarding concerned and unconcerned citizens. Analysing the case of pricing policy,
the welfare losses noticed were caused by the high toll rates, which caused a higher
equality point than in ideal circumstances with reduced demand on the motorway,
the remaining part of the traffic used the parallel primary roads in environmentally
more sensitive areas (cities etc.).
The goals of the transport provider and its interest groups were to fight for and
win the best conditions and assurances regarding the concession contract, neverthe-
less reach their proposed, planned aims and meanwhile arisen goals. In short, their
proposed goals were to reach financial feasibility and bankability [4], since during
the life cycle of the concession company they aimed state financial contribution in
the motorway project. The main conflict – between the politicians/regulators and
other key actors –was the degree of state contribution in themotorway development.
Private investorswanted to get state guarantees on borrowed loans, independent pro-
fessionals advised to the state decision makers that a minimal degree of involvement
of state budget financial resources was needed by the development, but the politi-
cians and regulators counteracted these initiations. International experiences and
trends are showing on the long run the impossibility of the development of road
infrastructure network with free admission to motorways, without toll collection
and in addition, the de facto lack of state financial resources has made it easier for
politicians to start to teach the public on the users pay principle to achieve their con-
cept. The only failure was the inadequate level of public involvement in transport
policy questions, especially in determining toll rates that considered the economic
conditions and purchasing power of the population.
Important experience is that personal contacts and personal information ex-
change is more effective than the mass media propaganda, as they are the most
popular means of politicians and parties before election periods.
Analysing the effectiveness of pricing policy (parallel with the success and
fulfilment of planned profit maximization) it can be assessed that the introduced
toll system was not able to meet the requirements of demand and supply, therefore
the applied toll rates were much higher than the ones that could have been accepted
by the customers. Evaluating the financing measure and regarding the Hungarian
concept aimed at developing the motorway network with the help of private cap-
ital, the investors from the private sector could, in effect, consider the policy of
private financing. This process was speeded up when the concessionaire of the
M5 motorway started the operation of the second Hungarian concession motorway
stage.
In case of the Hungarian study tendering procedure, the final discussions and
signing of the concession contract and post-discussionswere involved in the analysis
of fairness regarding transport providers. The international tendering procedure
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created a situation, in which many different, foreign and domestic bidders were
involved. It can be established that the preparation of the tender satisfied all the
possible consortiums, and regarding the financial value of the full project, the ten-
dering procedure was fairly fulfilling the needs of international and domestic road
constructing, operating and maintenance enterprises, foreign and national banks
and the main lender, the EBRD.
The views of the stakeholders of different modes (passenger cars, HGVs,
buses etc.) did not differ in a relevant way. Regarding private financing, they all
greeted the construction of the new motorway stages (saving time compared with
the estimated time gap in case of public financing method); they all aimed minimal
toll rates to be paid when using the service of the transport provider. Considering
the whole public, when the government bought out the concession company, it gave
priority to users’ short term interest against taxpayers’ long term interest [4].
The advised thesis based on the Hungarian case could be that the transport
policy implementation in case of private participants could have been got through
easier because of additional financial resources and the need for efficient appropri-
ation of private capital. In case of private financing and tolling there was a gradual
implementation, but their elaboration and realization were carried out in a ‘big-
bang’ way with several serious mistakes. The media played a significant role in
implementing and accepting transport policies.
The Hungarian case study seems to verify and validate the alluded decision
tree model [1] and contend the supposed factors which could be responsible for
success or failure of a transport policy measure (see Fig.2). The expectations can
be quite fully confirmed, excluding the factor of national habits and norms, in this
case the strong bargaining power at the table could probably be expletive.
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The legal and institutional system in Hungary was just transforming from a cen-
trally planned economy to a market economy by the time the M1/M15 motorway
project was initiated. But this framework was still insufficient and led to seri-
ous mistakes during the implementation of transport policies, increasing regulatory
risks for private investors. That means after signing the concession contract and
private investment (in form of sunk costs), the concessionaire became exploitable
by the government and the regulatory authorities. The active political power was al-
ways stronger to influence decisions on transport infrastructure developments than
professionals (e.g. disregarding the need for more state contribution stressed by
independent professionals). Politicians had an incentive to exploit the investor’s
weak bargaining position by lowering user charges, they respected that infrastruc-
ture by its very nature is used by a large part of the (voting) population. This
regulated market environment did not offer strong institutional safeguards against
this opportunistic behaviour. Hungary still faces essential elementary changes in the
institutional system. Due to the circumstances of transition in Hungary, insufficient
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information and experience (too optimistic traffic andmacroeconomic forecasts) led
to unrealistic economic estimations and ultimate failure of the project. Information
provision in the implementation process played an important role, but acceptability
played only a minor role in this case. The public felt to be treated unfearly be-
cause of the applied pricing policy, what led to two litigations against the operating
company [3].
Synthesising conclusions of presented and further analyses [2], the following
general policy recommendations can be established. The public has to understand
the problem a policy measure is intended to solve (problem perception), and to be
convinced about its effectiveness. It is important for the decision-maker to spend
resources on making his policies comprehensible to the audience. Otherwise, the
policy measure will not be accepted. In addition he must explain why this measure
is superior to othermeasures thatmay lookmore plausible atfirst glance. Politicians
and transport managers have to take possible reactions of the media into account. In
particular, they should avoid as much as possible everything which allows the media
or opponents to negatively emotionalize the topic. This may mean, in some cases,
that the policy measure has to be adjusted to prevent a negative media response. It
may well be that this adjustment will lead to substantial departures from the ‘first
best’ policy. Furthermore, politicians need to be aware of the fact that in cases,
where positive welfare effects of a policy are not obvious, and where long chains of
reasoning are necessary to explain the welfare gains, these are likely to go unnoticed
in the public debate. In such a case people will judge a policy measure only by
their individual gains and losses. Thus, a successful communication strategy needs
to highlight the individual gains rather than focusing on a societal level. Finally, it
is important to solve possible conflicts with certain interest groups, e.g. consumer
protection groups before the launch of a policy measure, to take their arguments
seriously and to involve them as much as possible in the implementation process.
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